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It is an article of faith in much applied work that disturbance terms are IID—Independent and 
Identically Distributed—across observations. Sometimes, this assumption is replaced by other 
assumptions that are more complicated but equally artificial. For example, when observations 
are  ordered  in  time,  the  disturbance  terms  εt  are  sometimes  assumed  to  follow  an 
―autoregression,‖ e.g., εt = λ εt−1 + δt , where now λ is a parameter to be estimated, and it is the 
δt  that  are  IID.  However,  there  is  an  alternative  that  should  always  be  kept  in  mind. 
Disturbances  are  DDD—Dependent  and  Differently  Distributed—across  subjects.  In  the 
autoregression, for example, the δt could easily be DDD, and introducing yet another model 
would only postpone the moment of truth. 
 
A  second  article  of  faith  for  many  applied  workers  is  that  functions  are  linear  with 
coefficients that are constant across subjects. The alternative is that functions are non-linear, 
with  coefficients  (or  parameters  more  generally)  that  vary  across  subjects.  The  dueling 
acronyms would be LCC (Linear with Constant Coefficients) and NLNC (Non-Linear with 
Non-constant Coefficients). Some models have ―random coefficients‖, which only delays the 
inevitable:  coefficients  are  assumed  to  be  drawn  at  random  from  distributions  that  are 
constant across subjects. Why would that be so? 
 
These articles of faith have had considerable influence on the applied literature. Therefore, 
when reading a statistical study, try to find out what kind of statistical analysis got the authors 
from the data to the conclusions. What are the assumptions behind the analysis? Are these 
assumptions plausible? What is allowed to vary and what is taken to be constant? If causal 
inferences  are  made  from  observational  data,  why  are  parameters  invariant  under 
interventions?  Where  are  the  response  schedules?  Do  the  response  schedules  describe 
reasonable thought experiments? 
 
For  applied  workers  who  are  going  to  publish  research  based  on  statistical  models,  the 
recommendation is to archive the data, the equations, and the programs. This would allow 
replication, at least in the narrowest sense of the term (Dewald et al., 1986; Hubbard et al., 
1998). Assumptions should be made explicit. It should be made clear which assumptions were 
checked, and how the checking was done. It should also be made clear which assumptions 
were not checked. Stating the model clearly is a good first step—and a step which is omitted 
with remarkable frequency, even in the best journals. 
 
Modelers may feel there are responses to some of these objections. For example, a variety of 
techniques  can  be  used  when  developing  a  model,  including  regression  diagnostics, 
specification tests, and formalized model selection procedures. These techniques might well 
be  helpful.  For  instance,  diagnostics  are  seldom  reported  in  applied  papers,  and  should 
probably be used more often. 
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In the end, however, such things work only if there is some relatively localized breakdown in 
the modeling assumptions—a technical problem which has a technical fix. There is no way to 
infer the ―right‖ model from the data unless there is strong prior theory to limit the universe of 
possible  models.  More  technically,  diagnostics  and  specification  tests  usually  have  good 
power only against restricted classes of alternatives (Freedman, 2008). The kind of strong 
theory needed to restrict the universe of models is rarely available in the social sciences. 
 
Model  selection  procedures  like  AIC  (Akaike‘s  Information  Criterion)  only  work—under 
suitable regularity conditions—―in the limit,‖ as sample size goes to infinity. Even then, AIC 
overfits. Therefore, behavior in finite samples needs to be assessed. Such assessments are 
unusual.  Moreover,  AIC  and  the  like  are  commonly  used  in  cases  where  the  regularity 
conditions do not hold, so operating characteristics of the procedures are unknown, even with 
very large samples. Specification tests are open to similar objections. 
 
Bayesian methods are sometimes thought to solve the model selection problem (and other 
problems too). However, in non-parametric settings, even a strictly Bayesian approach can 
lead to inconsistency, often because of overfitting. ―Priors‖ that have infinite mass or depend 
on the data merely cloud the issue. For reviews, see Diaconis and Freedman (1998), Eaton 
and Freedman (2004), Freedman (1995). 
 
2.1. The Bootstrap  
 
How does the bootstrap fit into this picture? The bootstrap is in many cases a helpful way to 
compute  standard  errors—given  the  model.  The  bootstrap  usually  cannot  answer  basic 
questions about validity of the model, but it can sometimes be used to assess impacts of 
relatively minor failures in assumptions. The bootstrap has been used to create chance models 
from data sets, and some observers will find this pleasing. 
 
2.1. The Role of Asymptotics  
 
Statistical procedures are often defended on the basis of their ―asymptotic‖ properties—the 
way they behave when the sample is large. See, for instance, Beck (2001:273): ―methods can 
be  theoretically  justified  based  on  their  large-[sample]  behavior.‖  This  is  an  over 
simplification. If we have a sample of size 100, what would happen with a sample of size 
100,000 is not a decisive consideration. Asymptotics are useful because they give clues to 
behavior for samples like the one you actually have. Furthermore, asymptotics set a threshold. 
Procedures that do badly with large samples are unlikely to do well with small samples. 
 
With the central limit theorem, the asymptotics take hold rather quickly: when the sample size 
is 25, the normal curve is a often a good approximation to the probability histogram for the 
sample average;  when the sample size is 100, the approximation is often excellent. With 
feasible GLS, on the other hand, if there are a lot of covariances to estimate, the asymptotics 
take hold rather slowly (Freedman 2005, chapter 7). 
 
The difficulties in modeling are not unknown. For example, Hendry (1980:390) writes that 
―Econometricians have found their Philosophers‘ Stone; it is called regression analysis and is 
used  for  transforming  data  into  ‗significant‘  results!‖  This  seriously  under-estimates  the 
number of philosophers‘ stones. Hendry‘s position is more complicated than the quote might 
suggest. Other responses from the modeling perspective are quite predictable. 
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Philosophers‘ stones in the early twenty-first century 
Correlation, partial correlation, Cross lagged correlation, Principal components, 
Factor analysis, OLS,GLS, PLS, IISLS, IIISLS, IVLS, FIML, LIML, SEM, GLM, 
HLM, HMM, GMM, ANOVA, MANOVA, Meta-analysis, Logits, Probits, Ridits, 
Tobits, RESET, DFITS, AIC, BIC, MAXENT, MDL, VAR, AR, ARIMA, ARFIMA, 
ARCH,  GARCH,  LISREL,  Partial  likelihood,  Proportional  hazards,  Hinges, 
Froots,  Flogs  with  median  polish,  CART,  Boosting,  Bagging,  MARS,  LARS, 
LASSO, Neural nets, Expert systems, Bayesian expert systems, Ignorance priors, 
WinBUGS, EM, LM, MCMC, DAGs, TETRAD, TETRAD II.... 
 
The modelers‘ response 
We  know  all  that.  Nothing  is  perfect.  Linearity  has  to  be  a  good  first 
approximation.  Log  linearity  has  to  be  a  good  first  approximation.  The 
assumptions are reasonable. The assumptions don’t matter. The assumptions are 
conservative. You can’t prove the assumptions are wrong. The biases will cancel. 
We can model the biases. We’re only doing what everybody else does. Now we use 
more sophisticated techniques. If we don’t do it, someone else will. What would 
you do? The decision-maker has to be better off with us than without us. We all 
have mental models. Not using a model is still a model. The models aren’t totally 
useless.  You  have  to  do  the  best  you  can  with  the  data.  You  have  to  make 
assumptions in order to make progress. You have to give the models the benefit of 
the doubt. Where’s the harm? 
 
2. CRITICAL LITERATURE  
 
For the better part of a century, many scholars in many different disciplines have expressed 
considerable skepticism about the possibility of disentangling complex causal processes by 
means  of  statistical  modeling.  Some  of  this  critical  literature  will  be  reviewed  here.  The 
starting point is the exchange between Keynes (1939, 1940) and Tinbergen (1940). Tinbergen 
was one of the pioneers of econometric modeling. Keynes expressed blank disbelief about the 
development: 
"No one could be more frank, more painstaking, more free from subjective bias or 
parti pris than Professor Tinbergen. There is no one, therefore, so far as human 
qualities  go, whom it would  be safer to  trust  with  black magic.  That  there is 
anyone I would trust with it at the present stage, or that this brand of statistical 
alchemy  is  ripe  to  become  a  branch  of  science,  I  am  not  yet  persuaded.  But 
Newton, Boyle and Locke all played with alchemy. So let him continue‖ (Keynes 
1940:156). 
 
Other familiar citations in the economics literature include Liu (1960), Lucas (1976) and Sims 
(1980).  Lucas  was  concerned  about  parameters  that  changed  under  intervention.  Manski 
(1995) returns to the problem of under-identification that was posed so sharply by Liu (1960) 
and Sims (1980): in brief, a priori exclusion of variables from causal equations can seldom be 
justified, so there will typically be more parameters than data. Manski suggests methods for 
bounding quantities that cannot be estimated. Sims‘ idea was to use low-dimensional models 
for policy analysis, instead of complex high-dimensional ones. Leamer (1978) discusses the 
issues created by inferring specifications from the data, as does Hendry (1980). Engle et al. 
(1983) distinguish several kinds of exogeneity assumptions. 
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Heckman (2000) traces the development of econometric thought from Haavelmo and Frisch 
onwards. Potential outcomes and structural parameters play a central role, but ―the empirical 
track record of the structural [modeling] approach is, at best, mixed‖ (p. 49). Instead, the 
fundamental contributions of econometrics are the insights  
―that causality is a property of a model, that many models may explain the same 
data and that assumptions must be made to identify causal or structural models...‖ 
(p. 89).  
 
Moreover,  econometricians  have  clarified  ―the  possibility  of  interrelationships  among 
causes,‖ as well as ―the conditional nature of causal knowledge and the impossibility of a 
purely empirical approach to analyzing causal questions‖ (pp. 89–90). Heckman concludes 
that  
―The information in any body of data is usually too weak to eliminate competing 
causal explanations of the same phenomenon. There is no mechanical algorithm 
for producing a set of ‗assumption free‘ facts or causal estimates based on those 
facts‖ (p. 91). 
 
Some  econometricians  have  turned  to  natural  experiments  for  the  evaluation  of  causal 
theories. These investigators stress the value of strong research designs, with careful data 
collection and thorough, context specific, data analysis. Angrist and Krueger (2001) have a 
useful survey.  
 
Rational  choice  theory  is  a  frequently-offered  justification  for  statistical  modeling  in 
economics and cognate fields. Therefore, any discussion of empirical foundations must take 
into account a remarkable series of papers, initiated by Kahneman and Tversky (1974), that 
explores the limits of rational choice theory. These papers are collected in Kahneman et al. 
(1982), Kahneman and Tversky (2000). The heuristics-and-biases program of Kahneman and 
Tversky has attracted its own critics (Gigerenzer, 1996). The critique is interesting, and has 
some merit. But in the end, the experimental evidence demonstrates severe limits to the power 
of rational choice theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996).  
 
The data show that if people are trying to maximize expected utility, they don‘t do it very 
well. Errors are large and repetitive, go in predictable directions, and fall into recognizable 
categories.  Rather  than  making  decisions  by  optimization—or  bounded  rationality,  or 
satisficing—people  seem  to  use  plausible  heuristics  that  can  be  classified  and  analyzed. 
Rational  choice  theory  is  generally  not  a  good  basis  for  justifying  empirical  models  of 
behaviour, because it does not describe the way real people make real choices.  
 
Sen (2002), drawing in part on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, gives a far-reaching 
critique of rational choice theory, with many counter-examples to the assumptions. The theory 
has its place, according to Sen, but also leads to ―serious descriptive and predictive problems‖ 
(p. 23). Nelson and Winter (1982) reached similar conclusions in their study of firms and 
industries. The axioms of orthodox economic theorizing, profit maximization and equilibrium 
create a ―flagrant distortion of reality‖ (p. 21).  
 
Almost from the beginning, there were critiques of modeling in other social sciences too. 
Bernert  (1983)  and  Platt  (1996)  review  the  historical  development  in  sociology.  Abbott 
(1997)  finds  that  variables  like  income  and  education  are  too  abstract  to  have  much 
explanatory power; so do models built on those variables. There is a broader examination of 
causal modeling in Abbott (1998). He finds that ―an unthinking causalism today pervades our International Econometric Review (IER) 
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journals and limits our research‖ (p. 150). He recommends more emphasis on descriptive 
work and on smaller-scale theories more tightly linked to observable facts—middle-range 
theories, in Robert Merton‘s useful phrase. Clogg and Haritou (1997) consider difficulties 
with regression, noting that endogenous variables can all too easily be included as regressors. 
Hedström  and  Swedberg  (1998)  present  a  lively  collection  of  essays  by  a  number  of 
sociologists  who are quite skeptical  about  regression models.  Rational choice theory  also 
takes its share of criticism.  
 
Goldthorpe  (1999,  2000,  2001)  describes  several  ideas  of  causation  and  corresponding 
methods of statistical proof, which have different strengths and weaknesses. He is skeptical of 
regression,  but  finds  rational  choice  theory  to  be  promising—unlike  other  scholars  cited 
above. He favors use of descriptive statistics to infer social regularities, and statistical models 
that reflect  generative processes. He finds the  manipulationist  account of causation  to  be 
generally  inadequate  for  the  social  sciences.  Ní  Bhrolcháin  (2001)  has  some  particularly 
forceful examples to illustrate the limits of modeling.  
 
Lieberson (1985) finds that in social science, non-experimental data are routinely analyzed as 
if they had been generated experimentally, the typical mode of analysis being a regression 
model with some control variables. This enterprise has ―no more merit than a quest for a 
perpetual  motion  machine‖  (p.  ix).  Finer-grain  analytic  methods  are  needed  for  causal 
inference, more closely adapted to the details of the problem at hand. The role of counter-
factuals is explained (pp. 45–48).  
 
Lieberson  and  Lynn  (2002)  are  equally  skeptical  about  mimicking  experimental  control 
through  complex  statistical  models:  simple  analysis  of  natural  experiments  would  be 
preferable. Sobel (1998) reviews the literature on social stratification, concluding that ―the 
usual modeling strategies are in need of serious change‖ (p. 345), also see Sobel (2000). In 
agreement  with  Lieberson,  Berk  (2004)  doubts  the  possibility  of  inferring  causation  by 
statistical modeling, absent a strong theoretical basis for the models—which rarely is to be 
found.  
 
Paul Meehl was a leading empirical psychologist. His 1954 book  (Meehl, 1954) has data 
showing the advantage of using regression, rather than experts, to make predictions. On the 
other hand, his 1978 paper (Meehl, 1978), ―Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, 
Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology,‖ saw hypothesis tests—and cognate 
black arts—as stumbling blocks that slowed the progress of psychology. Meehl and Waller 
(2002)  discusses  the  choice  between  two  similar  path  models,  viewed  as  reasonable 
approximations to some underlying causal structure, but does not reach the critical question—
how to assess the adequacy of the approximations.  
 
Steiger (2001) provides a critical review of structural equation models. Larzalere et al. (2004) 
offer  a  more  general  discussion  of  difficulties  with  causal  inference  by  purely  statistical 
methods. Abelson (1995) has a distinctive viewpoint on statistics in psychology. There is a 
well-known book on the logic of causal inference, by Cook and Campbell (1979). Also see 
Shadish et al. (2002), who have among other things a useful discussion of manipulationist 
versus non-manipulationist ideas of causation.  
 
Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis (2006) suggest that quantitative models in the environmental and 
health  sciences  are  highly  misleading.  Also  see  Lomborg  (2001),  who  criticizes  the 
Malthusian position. The furor surrounding Lomborg‘s book makes one thing perfectly clear. Freedman-Limits of Econometrics 
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Despite  the  appearance  of  mathematical  rigor  and  the  claims  to  objectivity,  results  of 
environmental models are often exquisitely tuned to the sensibilities of the modelers.  
 
In political science, after a careful review of the evidence, Green and Shapiro (1994) conclude 
―despite its enormous and growing prestige in the discipline, rational choice theory has yet to 
deliver  on  its  promise  to  advance  the  empirical  study  of  politics‖  (p.  7).  Fearon  (1991) 
discusses the role of counter-factuals. Achen (1982, 1986) provides an interesting defence of 
statistical models; Achen (2002) is substantially more skeptical. Dunning (2008) focuses on 
the assumptions behind IVLS.  
 
King et al. (1994) are remarkably enthusiastic about regression. Brady and Collier (2004) 
respond  with  a  volume  of  essays  that  compare  regression  methods  to  case  studies. 
Invariance—together  with  the  assumption  that  coefficients  are  constant  across  cases—is 
discussed under the rubric of causal homogeneity. The introductory chapter (Brady et al., 
2004) finds that  
―it is difficult to make causal inferences from observational data, especially when 
research focuses on complex political processes. Behind the apparent precision of 
quantitative  findings  lie  many  potential  problems  concerning  equivalence  of 
cases,  conceptualization  and  measurement,  assumptions  about  the  data,  and 
choices about model specification. ... The interpretability of quantitative findings 
is strongly constrained by the skill with which these problems are addressed‖ (pp. 
9–10).  
 
There is a useful discussion in Political Analysis vol. 14, no. 3, summer, 2006. Also see 
George and Bennett (2005), Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003). The essay by Hall in the 
latter reference is especially relevant.  
 
One of the difficulties with regression models is accounting for the εt‘s. Where do they come 
from, what do they mean, and why do they have the required statistical properties? Error 
terms are often said to represent the overall effects of factors omitted from the equation. But 
this characterization has problems of its own, as shown by Pratt and Schlaifer (1984, 1988).  
 
In Holland (1986, 1988), there is a super-population model—rather than individualized error 
terms—to  account  for  the  randomness  in  causal  models.  However,  justifying  the  super-
population model is no easier than justifying assumptions about error terms. Stone (1993) 
presents a super-population model with some observed covariates and some unobserved; this 
paper is remarkable for its clarity.  
 
Recently, strong claims have been made for non-linear methods that elicit the model from the 
data  and  control  for  unobserved  confounders,  with  little  need  for  substantive  knowledge 
(Spirtes et al., 1993; Pearl, 2000). However, the track record is not encouraging (Freedman, 
1997, 2004; Humphreys and Freedman, 1996, 1999). There is a free-ranging discussion of 
such issues in McKim and Turner (1997). Other cites to the critical literature include Oakes 
(1990), Diaconis (1998), Freedman (1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2005). Hoover (2008) is 
rather critical of the usual econometric models for causation, but views nonlinear methods as 
more promising.  
 
Matching may sometimes be a useful alternative to modeling, but it is hardly a universal 
solvent.  In many  contexts  there will be little difference between matching and modeling, 
especially if the matching is done on the basis of statistical models, or data from the matching International Econometric Review (IER) 
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are subjected to model-based adjustments. For discussion and examples, see Glazerman et al. 
(2003); Arceneaux et al. (2006); Wilde and Hollister (2007); Berk and Freedman (2008); 
Review of Economics and Statistics, February (2004) vol. 86, no. 1; Journal of Econometrics, 
March–April (2005) vol. 125, nos. 1–2.  
 
3. RESPONSE SCHEDULES  
 
The response-schedule model is the bridge between regression and causation. This model was 
proposed by Neyman (1923). The paper is in Polish, but there is an English translation by 
Dabrowska and Speed (1990) in Statistical Science, with discussion. Scheffé (1956) gave an 
expository treatment. The model was rediscovered a number of times, and was discussed in 
elementary textbooks of the 1960s: see Hodges and Lehmann (1964, section 9.4). The setup is 
often called ―Rubin‘s model:‖ see for instance Holland (1986, 1988), who cites Rubin (1974). 
That simply mistakes the history.  
 
Neyman‘s  model  covers  observational  studies—in  effect,  assuming  these  studies  are 
experiments after suitable controls have been introduced. Indeed, Neyman does not require 
random  assignment  of  treatments,  assuming  instead  an  urn  model.  The  model  is  non-
parametric, with a finite number of treatment levels.  
 
Response  schedules  were  developed  further  by  Holland  (1986,  1988)  and  Rubin  (1974) 
among  others,  with  extensions  to  real-valued  treatment  variables  and  parametric  models, 
including linear causal relationships. Response schedules help clarify the process by which 
causation can be, under some circumstances, inferred by running regressions on observational 
data. The mathematical elegance of response schedules should not be permitted to obscure the 
basic issue. To what extent are the assumptions valid, for the applications of interest? 
 
4. EVALUATING MODELS  
 
One chapter in  Statistical Models: Theory and Practice  discussed a regression model for 
McCarthyism  (Gibson,  1988).  Other  chapters  considered  a  probit  model  for  the  effect  of 
Catholic schools (Evans and Schwab, 1995), a simultaneous-equation model for education 
and  fertility  (Rindfuss  et  al.,  1980),  and  a  linear  probability  model  for  social  capital 
(Schneider et al., 1997). In each case, there were serious difficulties. The studies were at the 
high  end  of  the  social  science  literature.  They  were  chosen  for  their  strengths,  not  their 
weaknesses.  The  problems  are  not  in  the  studies,  but  in  the  modeling  technology.  More 
precisely,  bad  things  happen  when  the  technology  is  applied  to  real  problems—without 
validating the assumptions behind the models. Taking assumptions for granted is what makes 
statistical techniques into philosophers‘ stones.  
 
5. SUMMING UP  
 
In the social and behavioral sciences, far-reaching claims are often made for the superiority of 
advanced quantitative methods—by those who manage to ignore the far-reaching assumptions 
behind  the  models.  In  section  2,  we  saw  there  was  considerable  skepticism  about 
disentangling causal processes by statistical modeling. Freedman (2005) examined several 
well-known modeling exercises, and discovered good reasons for skepticism. Some kinds of 
problems  may  yield  to  sophisticated  statistical  technique;  others  will  not.  The  goal  of 
empirical research is—or should be—to increase our understanding of the phenomena, rather 
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